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After Bostock: 11th Circuit Extends
Landmark Case and Strikes Down
School’s Transgender Bathroom
Policy Under Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause *
I. INTRODUCTION
When Drew Adams walked into Nease High School one fall day and
was told that he could no longer use the boy’s restroom at school, he
could never have known that years down the road his case would be so
important to so many others. In the past decade, there has been a
heated debate over transgender rights broadly, and specifically whether
it was permissible to ban transgender persons from using the bathroom
corresponding to their gender identity.
The landscape changed in June 2020 with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Bostock v. Clayton County.1 In Bostock, the Court expanded
protections for transgender persons under Title VII and reignited the
conversation over the legal scope of transgender rights.2
With the case of Drew Adams before them, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had one of the first opportunities to
interpret both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause through the
lens of Bostock, and the court’s decision to affirm Mr. Adams’s claims on
both fronts will frame the debate for months and years to come.

* This would not have been possible without the help of Professor Scott Titshaw, whose
guidance and knowledge impacted me far beyond the scope of this Article. And a big
thank you to my family, whose endless love and support makes all the difference in the
world.
1 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
2 Id.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Drew Adams was a student at Nease High School in Florida’s St.
Johns County School District. Mr. Adams is transgender. He was
assigned female gender at birth, but today lives his life as a male.3
Mr. Adams’s designation as female caused him severe anxiety and
depression throughout his early life, leading him to seek help from
mental health professionals. By the time he reached the eighth grade,
he had come to the realization that he was a boy, not a girl. A diagnosis
of gender dysphoria supported this realization. Gender dysphoria is a
condition that causes debilitating anxiety in a person whose gender
identity is different from the sex they were assigned at birth. To treat
this, Mr. Adams’s psychiatrist recommended that he make the
transition to living as a male.4
Along with the social transition, Mr. Adams began taking medical
steps to treat his gender dysphoria. He started on a regimen of birth
control and testosterone and underwent a bilateral mastectomy to
remove his breast tissue. He successfully petitioned Florida to change
the sex indicator on both his driver’s license and birth certificate to
reflect his gender as male.5
Mr. Adams began attending Nease High School, a public school,
after socially transitioning to living as a male. He exclusively used the
boy’s bathroom for about two months but was then forbidden from doing
so by school officials after they received complaints from two female
students. Instead, school administrators required him to use either a
single-stall, gender-neutral bathroom, or one of the women’s restrooms.6
In acting to prevent Mr. Adams from using the boy’s bathroom,
Nease High School officials claimed to be enforcing St. Johns County
School District’s unwritten bathroom policy. This alleged policy
mandated that a student must use the restroom which corresponds to
the “biological sex” recorded on their enrollment documents. Mr. Adams
entered the School District in the fourth grade, when he still presented
as female. The School District therefore regarded him as a “biological
girl” and would not allow him to use the boy’s facilities.7
Mr. Adams’s situation was not altogether unforeseen by the School
District. In 2012, the School District began researching “best practices”
with regard to issues raised by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
queer (LGBTQ) students. Relying on these “best practices,” the School
Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. John’s County, 968 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1292.
5 Id. at 1292.
6 Id. at 1293.
7 Id. at 1293–94.
3
4
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District determined that transgender students were to be given access
to gender-neutral restrooms and asserted that it was the School
District’s belief that no law would require that transgender students be
allowed access to the restroom corresponding with their gender
identity.8
In the course of researching these “best practices,” the School
District encountered other school districts that permit transgender
students to access the restroom conforming with their gender identity.
However, the School District refused to adopt such a policy out of the
fear it might be abused by an individual claiming to be “gender-fluid.”
This assertion had no factual grounding, as the School District had
never encountered or uncovered any student trying to take advantage of
such a policy.9
Throughout Mr. Adams’s first two years of high school, he and his
mother repeatedly protested the School District’s bathroom policy but
were ultimately unsuccessful. Accordingly, Mr. Adams sued the School
District in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida in June 2017.10 He alleged the School District’s bathroom policy
violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment11 and Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972
(Title IX)12 by barring him from the boy’s bathroom at school.13
Mr. Adams initially asked for injunctive, declarative, and monetary
relief, and shortly thereafter moved for a preliminary injunction to
prevent the School District from enforcing its bathroom policy. This
motion was denied in August 2017, but a bench trial was set for
December 2017 on an expediated schedule. After the three-day bench
trial, the judge held that Mr. Adams was entitled to declaratory,
injunctive, and monetary relief on both claims. The School District
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
which affirmed the decision of the District Court.14

Id. at 1294.
Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. John’s County, 968 F.3d 1286, 1294–95 (11th Cir. 2020).
10 Id.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2020).
13 Adams, 968 F.3d at 1295.
14 Id.
8
9
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX)
provides that no person “shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance . . . .”15
A great deal of the development relevant to Title IX has come
through decisions involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), a statute that shares many similarities with Title IX. Title
VII declares that it is “unlawful . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”16 Although Title IX and Title VII are
separate statutes, courts have looked to cases interpreting Title VII to
aid in evaluating Title IX claims.17
While initially quite narrow, the meaning of “sex” has broadened
significantly in recent years. In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,18
the Supreme Court addressed just how broadly Title VII protections
were to be construed. Meritor Bank made the argument that the focus
of Title VII was on “tangible, economic barriers erected by
discrimination.”19 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, instead
holding that, “Title VII is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’
discrimination. The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women.’”20 This broad
interpretation of Title VII laid the foundation for future decisions to
expand the protections afforded by the statute.
A decade or so later in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.,21 the Supreme Court considered whether Title VII’s prohibition
against discrimination “because . . . of sex” would apply when the

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e – 2(a)(1) (2020) (emphasis added).
17 See Jennings v. University of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007);
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999) (using Title VII cases to
interpret Title IX cases).
18 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
19 Id. at 64.
20 Id.
21 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
15
16
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harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex.22 Joseph
Oncale, who worked for Sundowner Offshore Services on an oil
platform, was forcibly subjected to sexual harassment by other male
employees.23 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Scalia asserted
that, “[i]f our precedents leave any doubt on the question, we hold today
that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination
‘because of . . . sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the
defendant . . . are of the same sex.”24 This opinion, authored by a
textualist Justice, demonstrated that the text of Title VII and its
kindred statutes could be read to protect other classes of people aside
from heterosexual men and women.
The new landmark Title VII decision is Bostock v. Clayton County,
where the Supreme Court combined three separate cases wherein an
employee was fired soon after their employers found out that they were
homosexual or transgender.25 The Court held that “[a]n employer who
fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that
person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of
a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the
decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.”26 In his opinion for the Court,
Justice Gorsuch explains this by way of example:
[T]ake an employer who fires a transgender person who identified as
male at birth but now identifies as female. If the employer retains an
otherwise identical employee who was identified as female at birth,
the employer intentionally penalizes a person identified as male at
birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified
as female at birth.27

The bottom line, as Justice Gorsuch puts it, is that “[f]or an employer
to discriminate against employees for being homosexual or transgender,
the employer must intentionally discriminate against individual men
and women in part because of sex. That has always been prohibited by
Title VII’s plain terms – and that should be the end of the analysis.”28
The ramifications of the Bostock decision are monumental. Not only
because they expanded protections for transgender persons in the
workplace under Title VII, but also because the highest court in the

Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
24 Id. at 79.
25 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1741.
28 Id. at 1743.
22
23
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land, in an opinion written by a conservative Justice, explicitly
determined that discrimination against homosexual or transgender
persons in a certain context comprised discrimination “because of sex.”29
B. Equal Protection Clause
Mr. Adams’s constitutional claim rested upon the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which ensures “equal protection
of the laws” to all persons of the United States.30 At their core, equal
protection cases ask whether the government’s classification of a group
of people can be sufficiently justified. The classifications and
appropriate levels of scrutiny vary. The Supreme Court of the United
States has repeatedly held that when state actors draw distinctions
using sex or gender, the Fourteenth Amendment calls for a heightened
standard of review.31 Specifically, the Supreme Court has held, “[t]o
withstand constitutional challenge . . . classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives.”32
Does
transgender
discrimination
constitute
gender-based
discrimination? Both the Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court (in the
Title VII context) have held that it does. In Glenn v. Brumby33 the
Eleventh Circuit, in a decision joined by Chief Judge William Pryor,
held “discrimination against a transgender individual because of her
gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s described as
being on the basis of sex or gender.”34 Recently, in Bostock, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed this approach.35 The Court held that “it is impossible
to discriminate against a person for being . . . transgender without
discriminating against that individual based on sex.”36
Applying the Equal Protection Clause test for gender discrimination,
it is essential to demonstrate a sufficiently important governmental
interest. In addressing the importance of the governmental interest,
courts have repeatedly highlighted the necessity of protecting the

Id.
US. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985).
32 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
33 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
34 Id. at 1317.
35 140 S. Ct. 1731.
36 Id. at 1741.
29
30
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privacy of students.37 Ordinarily these privacy rights are found in the
Fourth Amendment context, such as preventing searches of a student’s
person,38 or prohibiting strip searches at school.39 Specifically, courts
have found that same-sex bathroom are permissible to advance privacy
needs.40
Courts have devised several principles that govern whether a policy
is substantially related to protecting an important governmental
interest. First, a governmental gender classification must be
“reasonable, not arbitrary.”41 The Equal Protection Clause requires a
substantial, accurate relationship between a gender-based classification
and its stated purpose.42 In Craig, an Oklahoma statute prohibited the
sale of low alcohol content beer to males under the age of 21 and
females under the age of 18 on the basis of dubious statistical
evidence.43 The Supreme Court struck down the statute because the
relationship between its purported purpose and actual language was
tenuous.44 Oklahoma’s purported objective was to enhance traffic
safety, but its means of achieving that objective, gender-based
distinctions on the purchase of alcohol, did not serve that purpose.45
Only 2% more males than females in the considered age group were
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.46 The Court held
that a 2% difference was hardly noteworthy and “ . . . prior cases have
consistently rejected the use of sex as a decision making factor even
though the statutes in question certainly rested on far more predictive
empirical relationships than this.”47 If a policy does not actually do
what it is supposed to, then the requisite substantial relationship
necessary to overcome heightened scrutiny cannot exist.48

37 See, e.g. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch.
Dist., 402 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2005); Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 1 Bd. Of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017).
38 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337–38 (1985). (Highlighting that “a search of a child’s person” at
school “is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.”).
39 Beard, 402 F.3d at 604 (6th Cir. 2005). (Noting “students of course have a significant
privacy interest in their unclothed bodies.”).
40 See Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 1993); Cumbey v. Meachum, 684
F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1982).
41 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
42 Craig, 429 U.S. at 198.
43 Id. at 204.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 199–200.
46 Id. at 201.
47 Id. at 202.
48 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).
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Second, the government’s rationale for a gender classification “must
be genuine, not hypothesized.”49 This is well illustrated in Glenn v.
Brumby. Vandy Beth Glenn was a transgender woman working in the
Georgia General Assembly’s Office of Legislative Counsel. She was
fired, in part, because, “some people would view it as a moral issue, and
that it would make Glenn’s coworkers uncomfortable.”50 Among other
reasons, Brumby, her supervisor, argued that “other women might
object to [her] bathroom use.”51 However, Glenn’s place of employment
had only single-occupancy restrooms, and Brumby himself testified that
a lawsuit on the basis of Glenn’s bathroom use was “unlikely.”52
Accordingly, the court dismissed Brumby’s defense of Glenn’s firing as a
“hypothetical justification . . . wholly irrelevant to the heightened
scrutiny analysis that is required here.”53
Third, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that gender
classifications “must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”54 Put
more plainly, gender-based policies will fail heightened scrutiny if they
treat people differently because they fail to conform to gender
stereotypes.55 When deciding whether these policies are enacted on the
basis of gender non-conformity, there must be proof of discriminatory
intent.56
Again, Glenn is illustrative of this standard. Brumby explained that
one reason for firing Glenn was because he viewed her as a “man
dressed as a woman and made up as a woman.”57 Further, Brumby
testified that he considered it “inappropriate . . . unsettling . . . and
unnatural” for Glenn to appear at work dressed as woman.58 Brumby’s
testimony provided overwhelming evidence of his discriminatory intent
to fire Glenn on the basis of her gender non-conformity, and the
Eleventh Circuit held as such.59

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1314.
51 Id. at 1321.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
55 Adams, 968 F.3d at 1301–02.
56 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977).
57 Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1320.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1321.
49
50
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IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
addressed both Mr. Adam’s Title IX claim and his Equal Protection
Clause claim. On the Title IX question, the majority and dissent took
opposing positions on whether the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
Title VII in Bostock also applied to Title IX.60 In examining the Equal
Protection claim, Judge Martin, writing for the majority, recognized
that transgender students were the gender classification being harmed
by the School District’s bathroom policy and that there was no
substantial relation between this exclusion and protecting student
privacy.61 Conversely, in his dissent, Chief Judge Pryor held that school
bathroom policy is not targeted at transgender students, but rather
applies to all students to protect their privacy interests, and therefore
survives intermediate scrutiny.62
A. Title IX
In lieu of a dearth of caselaw corresponding to the Title IX claim, the
court leans heavily on the recent ruling in Bostock.63 Of course, Bostock
addresses Title VII and Mr. Adams is bringing a claim under Title IX.
The court notes that while they are separate statutory provisions, “both
titles prohibit discrimination against individuals on the basis of sex.”64
Importantly, the court follows the central holding of Bostock, and
concluding that “Title IX, like Title VII, prohibits discrimination
against a person because he is transgender, because this constitutes
discrimination based on sex.”65
The court then ponders whether Mr. Adams was actually
discriminated against because he is transgender.66 Again, the court
follows the example of Bostock, illustrating that “[i]f Mr. Adams were a
non-transgender boy, the School Board would permit him to use the
boy’s restroom . . . [b]ut because Mr. Adams is a transgender boy, the
School Board singled him out for different treatment.”67 Every student
aside from Mr. Adams was permitted to use the restroom matching the

Adams, 968 F.3d at 1304–05.
Id. at 1297.
62 Id. at 1313 (Pryor, C.J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 1305.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. John’s County, 968 F.3d 1286, 1306 (11th Cir. 2020).
60
61
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sex on their legal documents, and this sort of different standard is,
according to the court, a violation of Title IX.68
The court also considers the harm that Mr. Adams suffered from
being isolated by the policy, and states that such emotional damage is
injurious.69 It also asserts that every court of appeals which has
considered a similar bathroom policy has reached the conclusion that it
violates Title IX.70
Finally, the court addresses a federal regulation71 that the School
District argued foreclosed Mr. Adams’s claim under Title IX. Under 34
C.F.R. § 106.33, “[a] recipient may provide separate toilet, locker room,
and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for
students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for
students of the other sex.”72
The School District contended that “sex” in the regulation ought to
be interpreted as “biological sex.”73 The court disagreed, and leaning on
Bostock one final time, declined to interpret the term “sex” because it
was not necessary to recognize the discrimination that Mr. Adams
suffered because he was transgender.74
In sum, the court concluded that “Bostock confirmed that workplace
discrimination against transgender people is contrary to law. Neither
should this discrimination be tolerated in schools.”75 In doing so, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the School
District’s bathroom policy violated Mr. Adams’s rights under Title IX.76
B. Equal Protection Clause
With respect to Mr. Adams’s claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the majority recognized both the heightened standard
required and that protecting student’s privacy is an important
governmental interest.77 The key distinction between the majority and
dissent is that the majority recognized that the School District’s
bathroom policy specifically targeted transgender students,
“. . . plac[ing] a special burden on transgender students because their
Id. at 1306–07.
Id. at 1307.
70 Id. at 1307–08.
71 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2020).
72 Id.
73 Adams, 968 F.3d at 1308.
74 Id. at 1309.
75 Id. at 1310.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1296–97.
68
69
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gender identity does not match their sex assigned at birth.”78 The court
holds that the School District’s bathroom policy is not substantially
related to that important governmental interest, and therefore
ultimately violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it is (i)
administered arbitrarily; (ii) the privacy concerns are “hypothesized”
and not reflected in the factual record; and (iii) the policy singles out
Mr. Adams because he defies gender stereotypes.79
1.
Arbitrary Administration
Like the policy restricting the purchase of beer in Craig, the court
holds that the bathroom policy does not do what it intends to do, nor
does it even exclude every transgender student from using the restroom
matching his or her gender identity.80 The court postulates that because
the school enforces bathroom usage based on the gender that the
student gives on their enrollment forms, a transgender student that
transitioned before enrolling would be able to use the bathroom
corresponding with their gender identity, whereas a student that
transitioned later would not.81
Accordingly, “the School District’s criteria for determining a
student’s bathroom use do not achieve the School Board’s stated goal of
restricting transgender students to the restroom of their assigned sex at
birth.”82 The Fourteenth Amendment requires a “substantial, accurate
relationship between a gender-based policy and its stated purpose[,]”
and the kind of arbitrary relationship that exists within the School
District’s bathroom policy is just the kind of thing heightened scrutiny
is meant to strike down.83
2.
“Hypothesized” Privacy Concerns
Next, the court points out that “[t]he School Board’s concerns about
transgender students endangering restroom privacy are not borne out
by the record.”84 According to United States v. Virginia, the
government’s policy, under a heightened scrutiny standard, must
address legitimate concerns, not hypothetical ones.85

Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1297.
80 Adams, 968 F.3d at 1298.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1298–99.
83 Id. at 1299.
84 Id.
85 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
78
79
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The School District’s argument that Mr. Adams’s presence in the
boy’s restroom endangered the privacy of the other male students was
not supported by any evidence.86 Indeed, the District Court found vast
evidence that Mr. Adams was very discrete when using the bathroom.87
There were no complaints from other boys of privacy violations in the
six weeks he was permitted to actually use the boy’s bathroom, and
there was no example anywhere in the country in which allowing
transgender students to use bathrooms corresponding to their gender
identity interfered with other student’s privacy rights.88
The School District also argued that “excluding transgender
students from the restroom matching their gender identity keeps
private the ‘different physiological characteristics between the two
sexes.’”89 The court dismissed this argument as inconsistent because
Mr. Adams had undergone medical procedures to increase the
masculinity of his body.90 In following the bathroom policy, Mr. Adams’s
masculine physiology would be present in the girl’s restroom, and the
School District would effectively be creating the situation that it is
purportedly seeking to prevent.91
The District Court construed the School District’s arguments as
“seem[ingly] disingenuous,” and the Eleventh Circuit echoed that
opinion, holding that the School District “failed to raise genuine, nonhypothetical justifications for excluding Mr. Adams from the boy’s
restroom.”92
3.
Defying Gender Stereotypes
Finally, the court addressed the issue of policies targeted at those
defying gender stereotypes.93 In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme
Court held that a sex classification “must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of
males and females.”94
Drew Adams’s status as a transgender man defies the stereotype
that one’s gender identity and how they comport themselves in day-to-

Adams, 968 F.3d at 1299.
Id.
88 Id. at 1300
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1301.
91 Id.
92 Adams, 968 F.3d at 1301.
93 Id.
94 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
86
87
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day life ought to correspond with their sex at birth.95 The Eleventh
Circuit ruled that “[t]he School Board’s bathroom policy sought to
enforce this gender stereotype.”96 Despite every effort by Mr. Adams to
prove the contrary, the School District has labeled him as “truly female”
and purposely excluded him from using the restroom matching his
gender identity because of that decision.97
The court compared Mr. Adams’s case to that of Vandy Beth Glenn,
in that they were both categorized as straying from accepted gender
stereotypes, and were subsequently punished for it.98 While Mr. Adams
was not treated as harshly as Glenn, the court reiterates that “the
Constitution does not tolerate any form of gender stereotyping on the
basis of one’s birth sex and sexual organs.”99
Taking each of the aforementioned principles into consideration, the
court held that the record “does not demonstrate that the School Board
has met its ‘demanding’ constitutional burden by showing a substantial
relationship between excluding transgender students from communal
restrooms and student privacy.”100 Therefore, the court affirmed the
ruling of the District Court and Mr. Adams prevailed on his Fourteenth
Amendment claim.101
C. Chief Judge Pryor’s Dissent
1.
Title IX
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Pryor concludes that the
School District’s bathroom policy does not violate Title IX.102 Pryor
argues that the Supreme Court’s reading of “sex” in Title VII in Bostock
did not resolve the meaning of “sex” in Title IX or its relation to sexseparated bathrooms.103 Refusing to rely on Bostock, Pryor searches for
the “plain meaning” of “sex” as written in Title IX, and concludes that
the term is not ambiguous and that it turns on “reproductive function,”
not “gender identity.”104 Therefore, under the unambiguous language of
the safe-harbor provision of Title IX which permits sex-separated

Adams, 968 F.3d at 1302.
Id.
97 Id. at 1303.
98 Id. at 1302–03.
99 Id. at 1303.
100 Id. at 1304.
101 Adams, 968 F.3d at 1304.
102 Id. at 1321. (Pryor, C.J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 1320. (Pryor, C.J., dissenting).
104 Id.
95
96
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bathrooms, the School District’s policy did not violate Title IX by
forbidding Mr. Adams from using the boy’s bathroom.105
2.
Fourteenth Amendment
Chief Judge Pryor also argues forcefully that the majority
misunderstands the classification at issue in the case and that this
mistake derails its constitutional analysis.106 Pryor contends that the
School District’s bathroom policy targets all male and female students
from using the bathroom of the opposite sex, not just transgender
students.107 Indeed, Pryor contends that the School District’s policy
provides transgender students an “accommodation” not a “special
burden” by giving them access to a gender-neutral restroom.108
Pryor continues by arguing that by classifying transgender students
as the target of the School District’s bathroom policy, the majority
undermines its analysis of the intermediate scrutiny test.109 If one
instead looks at the target of the policy as all students, then in Pryor’s
opinion the outcome is clear; the School District has an important
interest in protecting the privacy of its students, and the bathroom
policy is substantially related to that important interest.110
V. IMPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court’s holding in Bostock that discrimination against
homosexual and transgender persons constitutes discrimination
“because of sex” pursuant to Title VII was very important. The Adams
case is among the first of the Bostock progeny that extend that holding
beyond Title VII and into other federal statutes.
The Eleventh Circuit joins the Seventh Circuit111 and the Fourth
Circuit,112 each of which have an encountered a school policy preventing
transgender students from using the restroom corresponding to their
gender identity and each of which have found such policies to violate
the Equal Protection Clause. The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits did so
in spite of fierce dissents that accused the majorities of
misunderstanding the Equal Protection Clause. This is an emerging
Id. at 1321 (Pryor, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1316. (Pryor, C.J., dissenting).
107 Adams, 968 F.3d at 1316. (Pryor, C.J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 1315. (Pryor, C.J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 1318. (Pryor, C.J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 1311–12. (Pryor, C.J., dissenting).
111 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1054.
112 Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 613 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that
transgender persons constitute a quasi-suspect class).
105
106
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controversy, not a settled one, and with the changing nature of the
federal judiciary, circuit splits may soon arise on the issue.
Perhaps most interestingly and controversial, is how the Eleventh
Circuit leaned on Bostock to read transgender discrimination as part of
sex discrimination for the purpose of an equal protection analysis and
thus subject to intermediate scrutiny. If other courts follow its lead,
such a reading could have seismic ramifications and further advance
protections for transgender peoples.
For now, Adams is a landmark victory for a group that has been
long scorned and castigated without meaningful legal reproach.
Transgender persons now have clear statutory protections. However,
this is the beginning of this fight, not the end, and Adams is but the
vanguard of future litigation in a post-Bostock world that will clarify
how Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause might be interpreted to
protect the rights of transgender persons.

Ben T. Tuten

